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Many nations have undergone significant trade liberalization in the last twenty years even 
as they have increased their use of contingent protection measures.  This raises the 
question of whether some of the trade liberalization efforts, at times accomplished 
through painful reforms, have been undone through a substitution from tariffs to non-
tariff barriers.  Among the new forms of protection, antidumping is the most relevant, as 
its use has spread from few developed countries to a large set of developing countries that 
are now among the most intense users of this instrument.  This paper uses a newly 
developed database to examine to what extent the use of antidumping in a large set of 
countries is systematically influenced by the reduction of applied sectoral tariffs.  The 
data set includes information on 29 developing and 7 developed countries from 1991 
through 2002.  After controlling for time-varying sectoral information as well as 
macroeconomic conditions, we find evidence of a substitution effect only for heavy users 
of antidumping among developing countries.  In particular, a one standard deviation 
increase in sectoral trade liberalization increases the probability of observing an 
antidumping initiation by 32 percent.  There is no similar statistically significant result 
for other developing countries or developed countries.  We also find robust evidence of 
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I.  Introduction 
The world’s trading nations have undertaken an unmistakable effort to reduce trade 
barriers over the last few decades.  Serious efforts to lower tariffs began in North 
America, Europe and Japan in the immediate post-war decades.  Many developing 
countries followed suit in more recent years, especially during the 1980s and 1990s.  
These efforts have resulted in significantly lower trade restrictions the world over. 
  There has been another distinct pattern that coexists with these liberalization 
episodes. In particular, nations all over the world have also begun to use administered 
protection procedures on selected import categories. The most important of these is the 
remarkable spread of antidumping duties, first in a small group of developed nations (the 
U.S., the E.U., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – i.e., the so-called traditional users) 
and then to a widening array of nations across the world.   
  In many instances, one can point to a particular pattern.  Nations begin a process 
of liberalization, tariffs are reduced, and then antidumping procedures begin take on a 
more pronounced role in the trade policy of these countries.  Such patterns occurred in 
the United States where average tariffs fell sharply in the 1950s through 1970s and were 
followed by a surge in the use of antidumping measures in the 1980s and onward.
1 
Mexico underwent a structural change in trade policy in the early 1980s that was 
followed subsequently by wider antidumping usage.  More recently, India experienced a 
remarkable trade liberalization in the 1990s but has since become the world’s heaviest 
user of antidumping procedures.   
At an aggregate level, Figure 1 is indicative of a substitution effect between tariffs 
                                                 
1 Irwin (2005) also shows that there was frequent use of antidumping in the 1950s and 1960s.   2 
and antidumping initiations, at least for the set of developing countries used in this paper 
(i.e., Panel B).  In fact, while the simple correlation for developed countries in Panel A is 
positive (i.e., 0.48) it is equal to -0.55 for developing countries.  These stylized facts raise 
an obvious question.  To what extent have domestic industries tried to use antidumping to 
replace recent tariff reductions at the sectoral level.  
The substitution of antidumping for tariffs has clear benefits for many of the 
actors involved in trade policy.  Governments committed to broad reductions in trade 
restrictions may face subsequent pressures from affected industries and import competing 
industries have a place to turn to in the event of economic distress.  Antidumping 
procedures can play an important role in dealing with that pressure for protection.  WTO 
rules allow governments to impose antidumping duties beyond most-favored-nation 
tariffs when an administering agency determines that foreign firms have “dumped” 
products (i.e., exported below cost or below home price) in the domestic market and that 
dumping has caused “material injury” to the domestic industry.  Thus, antidumping rules 
are an administratively determined process of protection on a narrow set of products.  
Although this potentially beneficial role for antidumping is often emphasized by 
antidumping supporters, there is a risk that the antidumping system could be used to 
neutralize (part of) the gains of trade liberalization.  Despite its importance, there is only 
a small, but growing, literature on the relationship between antidumping and trade 
liberalization.  Moore and Zanardi (forthcoming) focus on one aspect of this relationship.  
In particular, they look at whether past antidumping use allowed developing countries to 
engage in more trade liberalization.  The empirical analysis of the “safety valve” role of 
antidumping (i.e., that protectionist pressures can be contained and channeled into   3 
antidumping while a broader trade liberalization campaign can continue) finds no 
systematic evidence of such a role in the data for a sample of 23 developing countries.  
Finger and Nogués (2005) consider a similar question and analyze the role of 
administered protection (i.e., antidumping and safeguard actions) in the Latin American 
experience with trade liberalization.  Their interviews and case studies lead them to 
conclude that these measures were a useful tool in dealing with protectionist pressures for 
even more drastic action.   
A related strand of this literature is represented by recent work by Feinberg and 
Reynolds (2007) and focuses on whether past trade liberalization results in an increased 
use of antidumping.  In particular, they analyze whether trade liberalization commitments 
(i.e., changes in bound tariffs) in the Uruguay Round are associated with an increased 
probability of antidumping petitions in 24 countries for the period from 1996 to 2003, 
including 17 developing nations. They find evidence that trade liberalization is associated 
with increased antidumping use in developing countries.  Instead, for traditional users of 
antidumping, increased liberalization results in less use of antidumping.  Bown and Tovar 
(2008) conduct a similar analysis focusing on India, which has recently become one of 
the heaviest users of antidumping after going through significant trade liberalization 
reforms in the early 1990s.  Their results suggest that Indian liberalization efforts have 
resulted in higher probability of antidumping filings. 
  In this paper, we examine the relationship, if any, between sectoral trade 
liberalization and subsequent antidumping use in a sample of 29 developing countries and 
7 developed countries over the period 1991-2002.  As in Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), 
we focus on the relationship between reduction in tariffs and the probability of observing   4 
the initiation of an antidumping petition.  Our unit of observation, like theirs, is the 
probability of observing an antidumping petition between two countries in a particular 
industry.   
However, our paper differs from their paper in three important ways.  First, we 
analyze applied tariffs rather than bound tariffs.  Thus, we are investigating whether trade 
policies actually in place affect antidumping behavior rather than the role of promised 
maximum (i.e. bound) tariff rates promised in international negotiations.  This distinction 
between bound and applied tariffs is especially important for developing countries, which 
often have very large “tariff overhangs” (i.e., the difference between applied and bound 
tariffs). Second, we control for other factors that the literature has found important in 
predicting antidumping initiations.  These include macroeconomic conditions in the 
importing country as well as time-varying industry effects (at the 3-digit ISIC level).  
Finally, we use a newly developed antidumping database by Moore and Zanardi 
(forthcoming) that is supplemented with information from Bown (2006).  This data set is 
based on primary government sources rather than WTO submissions, the latter of which 
can have important deficiencies of coverage and accuracy.
2 
We find that tariff reductions lead to higher probability of antidumping use but 
only for developing countries that are intensive users of antidumping.  This result does 
not hold for other developing countries nor for developed countries.  Controlling for other 
determinants of antidumping filing allows us to provide robust and consistent evidence of 
retaliation and deflection effects, as well as of macro and micro (i.e., industry level) 
influences on the decision to file an antidumping case. 
                                                 
2 Other differences include a larger set of importing countries, a much larger set of exporters, a longer time 
span, and more disaggregate industrial sectors.    5 
The paper is organized in the following way.  We first provide a brief overview of 
relevant literature in Section II.  Section III discusses the data and econometric strategy.  
We turn to the econometric results and their economic significance in section IV.  
Concluding remarks are included in section V.  
 
II.  Literature review 
The economic literature on antidumping has a long history that cannot be summarized 
here.
3 On top of the studies already mentioned in the introduction, this paper expands on 
two distinct strands of the empirical antidumping literature.
4   
The first set of papers examines the determinants of antidumping initiations. For 
many years the focus has been on the traditional users of antidumping measures.  
Feinberg (2005) focuses exclusively on filing behavior of U.S. firms and finds that an 
appreciating domestic currency and falling GDP growth rates lead to higher incidence of 
filings.  Knetter and Prusa (2003) analyze filing patterns within four major traditional 
users of antidumping and find similar results.
5  
More recently, focus has turned towards examining a broader group of countries 
as antidumping use extends beyond the traditional users.  Francois and Niels (2006) focus 
their attention on Mexico exclusively and analyze business cycle effects on Mexican 
antidumping filings and also find that exchange rate appreciation increases the probability 
                                                 
3 Prusa and Blonigen (2003) provide a broad survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.  
4 We are aware of only one theoretical paper that analyzes why countries would switch from tariffs to 
antidumping duties.  Anderson and Schmitt (2003) show that a government might prefer to use 
antidumping (or quotas) if international commitments prevent it from using tariffs.  Unfortunately, this 
insight does not provide much guidance for the empirical analysis undertaken in this paper.   
5 Leidy (1997) also finds similar results using a much smaller sample of U.S. aggregate filings.  Instead, 
Feinberg (1989) reaches an opposite conclusion with regard to the role of exchange rate movements (i.e., a 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar leads to more filings) when analyzing U.S. antidumping filings in the early 
1980s.  Feinberg (2005) suggests that the inconsistency in the results on the exchange rate is only apparent 
and due to learning on the part of petitioners about the way the U.S. administration operates.   6 
of a filing.  They also find that an increase in the current account deficit or a decrease in 
manufacturing sector growth increases the probability of observing an antidumping 
petition.  Bown (2008) looks in detail at the filing decisions in nine new major users of 
antidumping and exploits sectoral variation in economic conditions to help explain filing 
behavior as well as final AD outcomes.  He finds that changing market conditions related 
to the WTO rules on antidumping as well as political economy considerations play an 
important role.
6   
Another strand of the literature examines how “retaliation” and trade “deflection” 
can influence AD filings. Prusa and Skeath (2002) consider whether strategic 
considerations help explain antidumping filings from 1980 through 1998 in addition to 
economic considerations for long-standing users of AD as well as new developing 
country users.  They conclude that while economic factors (such as import surges) matter, 
those countries filing antidumping petitions may also consider whether the trading partner 
may react by imposing its own contingent protection.  Blonigen and Bown (2003) use a 
nested logit approach to exam in detail whether the potential for foreign retaliation can 
affect the probability that an antidumping case will be filed in the U.S. for the 1980 to 
1998 period.  Among other findings, they provide evidence that strategic considerations, 
in particular the share of U.S. exports in the potential target country, can influence the 
decision to file a case.  Bown and Crowley (2007) consider how AD filings in the U.S. 
against Japanese exports from 1992 to 2001 affected third markets, an effect that they call 
trade “deflection.”  They find strong evidence of such an effect, which raises the 
possibility that other countries’ industries might react by filing their own antidumping 
                                                 
6 Bown (2008) faces our same data limitations when controlling for sector specific economic conditions. 
This explains why he only analyzes nine countries.   7 
petitions.  Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) consider a broader group of countries that 
includes new users to analyze retaliation motives for the 1995-2003 period.  They find 
evidence in this broader set of countries that retaliation for past antidumping cases and 
trade deflection can influence filing behavior:  deflection plays a role in new and 
traditional users but retaliation considerations are important only for the former. 
These papers certainly suggest that it is important in the empirical analysis to 
control for macroeconomic and sectoral conditions, as well as for other determinants of 
antidumping filings. Although the primary focus of this paper is whether trade 
liberalization (as defined by reductions in sectoral applied rather than bound tariffs) can 
influence antidumping filings, we also contribute to the literature reviewed above by 
providing a unified framework to analyze the various channels (i.e., retaliation, trade 
deflection, micro and macroeconomic factors) that have been found to influence filings. 
 
III.  Econometric Methodology and Data 
We analyze the determinants of the probability of observing the initiation of an 
antidumping petition in a given industrial sector for a particular pair of trading countries.  
The basic econometric strategy for the paper is straightforward.  A domestic industry has 
some utility associated with its current economic condition that is negatively correlated 
with economic pressures from import sources.  If this utility falls below some minimum 
level, the firms in the industry may decide to file an antidumping petition.  However, we 
do not observe the level of utility but only whether a petition is filed in country i against 
country j in sector k.  A natural model is to use a probit framework:  
( ) ( ) 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1   1 P − − − − + + + + Φ = = it ikt ijkt ikt ijkt T y μ β σ β ρ β τ β α              (1)   8 
where yijkt takes on a value of 1 if an antidumping petition is filed by importing country i 
against trade partner j in sector k in year t and Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution.  
Information about country i’s sectoral applied tariffs (including changes and levels) is 
included in the vector τik.  The possibility of retaliation between the importing and 
exporting country pairs as well as measures for deflection are included in ρijk.  We also 
control for sectoral conditions in country i in sector k in the matrix σik.  Data on the 
macroeconomic conditions in the importing country are included in the matrix μi.  The 
nature of these cases is that there are unobservables that cannot be accounted for.  
Consequently, we include industry and year fixed effects in the estimation procedures.  
Note that in all the specifications each regressor is lagged one period from the year in 
which the probability of an initiation is assessed since antidumping authorities look at 
past performance to decide on the merit of a filing (and petitioners take this aspect into 
account when deciding whether to file or not a case).
7 
Our sample consists of 7 developed and 29 developing countries for the 1991-
2002 time frame.  The basic unit of observation is whether a petition is filed in each of 
the 29 (3-digit ISIC) manufacturing sectors in a particular importing country against an 
exporter.  Data on antidumping has been collected by the authors and supplemented with 
information from Bown (2006) while tariff data come from the World Bank Trade and 
                                                 
7 The lag of the trade liberalization variable also attenuates a potential endogeneity problem whereby (past 
or prospective) use of antidumping may make trade liberalization more likely (i.e., antidumping as a “safety 
valve”).  Two other factors reduce the potential for endogeneity problems. First, Moore and Zanardi (2007) 
show that past use of antidumping actually deters further trade liberalization in a sample of developing 
countries very similar to the one employed in this paper.  This suggests that smaller tariff changes may 
result in fewer antidumping initiations since trade protection is, ceteris paribus, higher so that our results 
will represent a conservative estimate of the overall link between trade liberalization and antidumping use.  
Second, if antidumping works as a safety valve so that trade liberalization takes place because of the 
possibility of antidumping protection, we should clearly detect a positive relationship between tariff cuts 
and initiations of antidumping petitions.     9 
Production database (Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007).
8  Sectoral trade data are extracted from 
WITS and are available for almost 180 exporting partners of the 36 countries in our 
sample.  Macroeconomic variables are from standard sources (i.e., the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators).  
We include only those countries that have an antidumping law in place in the 
years under analysis.  Furthermore, we split the sample into developing and developed 
countries because of the widely varying experience with antidumping.  Table 1 includes 
some basic information about the importing countries analyzed in the study along with 
their use of antidumping vis-à-vis the set of exporters included in the sample and the 
average trade liberalization in the data set. It is no surprise to see quite a huge variation in 
the use of antidumping among developing countries with the usual suspects among the 
developing countries emerging as heavy users (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, India) and the 
traditional users confirming their reputation.
9  In our data set, approximately 0.85 percent 
of the country-sector-year observations for the developed countries actually record the 
filing of an antidumping petition.  The analog for developing countries is even smaller at 
0.50 percent. This means that antidumping petitions remain a rare occurrence in 
international trade relations.
10   
Table 1 also reports the average trade liberalization in sectoral applied tariffs that 
occurred over the sample period (where trade liberalization is defined as a positive 
percentage change).  On average developed countries have liberalized more than their 
                                                 
8 Availability of tariff data determines the sample of countries included in the analysis. 
9 New Zealand filed fewer petitions in our sample period than in previous years. 
10 Antidumping’s effect on overall international trade flows is still an open question.  Vandenbussche and 
Zanardi (2006) find that antidumping has had an important impact on trade, even in sectors not directly 
involved in antidumping petitions, especially in the developing world.  Egger and Nelson (2007) find 
negative, but modest, impacts in their analysis.   10  
developing country counterparts although they started from much lower applied rates at 
the beginning of the sample.  
  Table 2 includes a list of variables used in the study with the expected signs in the 
regressions and the variables’ definitions.
11  As expressed in (1), regressors can be 
divided into four basic types.  All the regressors are lagged one period from the year in 
which the probability of an initiation is assessed.  In the following descriptions, the “base 
year,” or t, is this one year lag. 
  The first set of regressors includes measures of trade liberalization, which are the 
primary variables of interest for this study, as well as the level of applied tariffs before 
the liberalization takes place.  Trade liberalization (TRADE_LIB) is defined as the 
percentage change in 3-digit ISIC sectoral applied tariffs.  We include two versions.  
TRADE_LIB2 is the change over two periods (i.e., from t-2 to t) while TRADE_LIB3 is 
the change over three years (i.e., from t-3 to t).
12  Note that we define a drop in tariffs as a 
positive number.  Consequently, we would expect to see a positive coefficient for either 
version of this variable if trade liberalization induces firms to respond by filing an 
antidumping suit to “recreate” a level of protection earlier in place.  We also control for 
the initial level of sectoral tariffs by including TARIFF LEVEL, which is the base year 
unweighted average applied tariff rates for the sector.  A positive coefficient for this 
variable might indicate that sectors that had been able to avoid trade liberalization in the 
past, perhaps through political pressure, might be more likely to try to access the 
antidumping process to obtain protection in the future.  A negative coefficient could 
                                                 
11 Some descriptive statistics are provided in Table 7 along with the economic significance of the results. 
12 Note that we excluded observations if TRADE_LIB was extremely large.  In particular, we excluded 
observations with TRADE_LIB larger than 1500% and 780% for developed and developing countries, 
respectively, which reflected natural breaks in the data.   11  
suggest that sectors with higher tariff barriers do not need to use antidumping since they 
already enjoy high protection.  
  The second set of explanatory variables controls for two types of responses (i.e., 
retaliation and deflection) to third country antidumping activities.   
Following the literature on the role of retaliation as a determinant of filings, we 
consider the number of antidumping initiations launched against the importing country by 
a particular exporting country in the same sector under analysis (RETALIATION_INIT).  
For example, if we were analyzing the probability that the U.S. steel industry would 
initiate an antidumping petition against Mexico in 2000, this variable would reflect the 
number of Mexican antidumping petitions filed against U.S. steel firms in 1999. 
RETALIATION_MEAS is the analog but includes the number of antidumping measures 
actually imposed.  We expect the coefficients on these regressors to be positive if the 
importing countries’ firms act to punish their foreign competitors for using the 
antidumping process.  The two variables do reflect slightly different relationships.  The 
former indicates the possibility of a final antidumping order and would likely have a 
smaller effect than the latter, which would indicate that the foreign government in fact 
has acted to limit imports of the product.  Other versions of retaliation are 
RETALIATION_INIT_COUNTRY and RETALIATION_MEAS_COUNTRY, which 
are calculated at the country level and defined as the number of initiations or measures 
received by an importer from a particular trade partner in any sector.  It is perhaps less 
clear why the importing industry should care about antidumping petitions involving other 
sectors but this variable has been used in previous papers so we include it here.  
In order to assess the relevance of trade deflection, we include variables that   12  
reflect the potential diversion of trade from other countries as a result of antidumping 
actions.  DEFLECTION_INIT (DEFLECTION_MEAS) is the number of antidumping 
initiations (measures) world-wide (exclusive of the importing country) for the specific 
sector analyzed.  We expect that the coefficients on these two regressors would be 
positive; as other nations initiate or impose antidumping measures in a sector, domestic 
firms will face more pressure from diverted imports and hence are more likely to initiate 
their own antidumping petitions.  Instead, DEFLECTION_INIT_AGG and 
DEFLECTION_MEAS_AGG are the count of the initiations and measures in any sector 
in all the countries so that they reflect the possibility of increased exports of various 
products to the importing country.   
WTO rules also require certain criteria to be met in order to impose antidumping 
duties, including evidence of injury to a domestic industry producing a similar product.  
One measure of such potential injury is a growing or large import presence.  To control 
for these considerations, we include IMPORT_GROWTH, which is the bilateral 
percentage change in sectoral imports from t-1 to t. We expect that the more imports have 
grown over this period from a particular trading partner, the more likely an antidumping 
petition will be filed, that is, the coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive.  
We also control for the share of imports (IMPORT_SHARE) from the potential “target” 
country in a given sector.  All else equal, we expect that an industry is more likely to file 
a case against countries with a larger import market share in this sector.   
We would prefer to have other disaggregated measures of the economic condition 
of the domestic industry that might reflect material injury.  Unfortunately, a systematic 
and comprehensive database for economic conditions for industrial sectors is not   13  
available across all countries and time periods.  Some data are available from the World 
Bank’s Trade and Production Database.  In some specifications, we include some of these 
data in the analysis:  OUTPUT_CHANGE and EMPLOYMENT_CHANGE are the 
percentage change in sectoral nominal output and total sectoral employment from t to t-1.  
We expect that falling production or employment will increase the likelihood of a petition 
so that the expected sign for the coefficients are negative. The downside to the inclusion 
of these variables is that it reduces the number of observations because of missing data.  
As a sensitivity test, we will report results when these variables are included.   
Finally, we control for various macroeconomic variables that might affect the 
decision to file.   
EXCHANGE_RATE is the bilateral exchange rate between the importing and 
exporting country pairs at time t, where a lower value represents a higher value of the 
domestic currency in terms of their trading partner’s currency.  As Knetter and Prusa 
(2003) point out, there is theoretical ambiguity about how a currency’s value should 
affect the incentives for filing.  However, the empirical studies cited above consistently 
find that a stronger currency is associated with increased use of antidumping so that we 
expect a negative value for the coefficient.   
We also include broad macroeconomic effects by computing three year averages 
(for years t, t-1, and t-2) of GROWTH, INFLATION, and CURRENT_ACCOUNT, 
which are annual real GDP growth, inflation, and current account balances (as a 
percentage of GDP), respectively. We expect that unstable economic conditions would 
result in higher probability of petitions so that the coefficients on GROWTH and 
INFLATION should be negative and positive, respectively.  We also expect that the   14  
coefficient on CURRENT_ACCOUNT should be negative if firms believe that a higher 
level of imports would make a government more likely to impose antidumping duties.  
Finally, we include real GDP per capita (GDP_PC) as a measure of economic 
development within the country.  We expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
It is worth discussing briefly how this set of variables compares with that of 
Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), which is the paper most closely related to our study.  The 
most important difference is the control for trade liberalization.  Finger and Reynolds use 
the (time unvarying) promised bound tariffs changes agreed at the Uruguay Round 
interacted with a log-trend to capture the dynamic phasing in of potential changes.  We 
focus instead on the time series of actual applied tariffs for each year of analysis.  The 
difference is important for two reasons. First, bound tariffs reflect the highest possible 
rate consistent with multilateral commitments while applied tariffs are the ones that firms 
actually face in practice.
13  Second, we want to exploit the actual time variation in tariffs 
to explain antidumping decisions.  Feinberg and Reynolds do so by interacting the 
promised change in the level of bound tariffs with a log trend since a time series of bound 
tariffs is not available to the public.  We use the statutory levels of sectoral tariffs instead, 
which are reported to the public. 
We also explore more channels for retaliation than in this earlier study.  Feinberg 
and Reynolds use a measure of whether a case was filed in the exporting country against 
the importing country in the previous year, regardless of the industrial sector.  We use 
this measure but also control for whether a case was filed in the same sector.  We believe 
that the latter is particularly important since it is not immediately clear why a domestic 
                                                 
13 The difference between the two is quite large across sectors for the developing countries included in our 
analysis, less for the developed countries (see WTO, 2007).    15  
industry should care whether another sector was targeted by a foreign country.  We also 
include measures actually imposed rather than focus only on initiations.  Feinberg and 
Reynolds include the trade level for imports in 1999 (i.e., the middle year of their 
sample).  We rely instead on time varying measures of imports: 1) the change in imports 
for the particular sector; and 2) the exporting country’s share of the domestic country’s 
imports of the industry in question.  Unlike Feinberg and Reynolds, we also include 
macroeconomic regressors in the analysis as well as time-varying economic conditions 
such as employment and output.   
 
IV.  Econometric results 
Estimation results are included in Tables 3 through 6.  All displayed estimates in these 
tables are the marginal probability effects of a change in the explanatory variable (or a 
discrete change for dichotomous regressors).  All regressions include year and industry 
fixed effects to control for unobserved (non-time varying) factors in the data but these 
coefficients are not reported to save on space.
14  We also provide a systematic discussion 
of the economic significance of the results in the next section.  These results are 
displayed in Table 7 along with descriptive statistics for the regressors.  
We report specifications for developed and developing countries separately as a 
result of (non-reported) estimations that strongly indicated systematic differences in the 
two subsamples.  Moreover, from the summary statistics in Table 1 we can single out 
some developing countries that are heavy users of antidumping and we will investigate 
the robustness of the results for developing countries when focusing on a sub-sample of 
                                                 
14 All results not reported are available upon request.   16  
heavy users (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa).
15 The first 
three tables contain the estimation results when we do not use the World Bank’s Trade 
and Production Database information for developed and developing countries, 
respectively.  Table 6 shows the econometric results when sectoral output and 
employment changes are included as regressors. 
The various specifications in each table include different versions of the main 
variable of interest (i.e, trade liberalization) or of control variables for deflection and 
retaliation effects.  One potential problem with our sample is that countries that have an 
antidumping law in place but have never used it may have a structurally different 
probability of observing an initiation than a country that has seen at least some 
antidumping activity.  Thus, the last column in Tables 3 and 4 reports the results as for 
the regression in the first column but including only countries that have initiated at least 
one antidumping initiation in the sample period.
16   
Since the primary focus in this paper is on whether there is evidence of a 
substitution effect between trade liberalization and filing of antidumping petitions, we 
focus on the trade liberalization variables first.  In Table 3, we see no evidence that such a 
dynamic substitution is occurring for developed countries in the sample period.  Recent 
changes in applied tariffs do not seem to influence the decision to file an antidumping 
petition in any of the specifications.  This holds for both the two- and three-year versions 
of the trade liberalization measures (TRADE_LIB2 and TRABLE_LIB3).  This result 
represents a difference from Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), who report the unexpected 
result that the coefficient for “traditional users,” which is very similar to our subsample of 
                                                 
15 Among developing countries, these countries have initiated more than twice the average number of 
petitions; similarly, their average annual number of initiations is twice the average of the sample. 
16 Norway and 11 countries are dropped from the developed and developing country samples, respectively.   17  
developed countries, is negative and significantly different from zero at a 10 percent 
level.
17  In their sample, this suggested that industries that are faced with less trade 
liberalization  are more likely to see antidumping initiations.   
There is also no evidence that sectors with high tariff levels are more likely to file 
an antidumping petition in developed countries; the coefficient on TARIFF_LEVEL is 
always positive but never significant.   
The results for the entire sample of developing countries (displayed in Table 4) 
suggest once again that a reduction in applied tariffs does not prompt later antidumping 
initiations in developing countries.  However, when focusing only on the heavy users of 
antidumping in Table 5, we see strong evidence that such a substitution effect may be at 
play: all the specifications reported in that table show that the coefficients for 
TRADE_LIB (both the two and three-year versions) are positive and significant at the 1 
percent level.  These results for a broad group of developing countries that are heavy 
users is consistent with Bown and Tovar’s (2008) study of antidumping use in India. We 
also see indications that a higher sectoral tariff level is consistently associated in a 
statistically significant way with a higher incidence of antidumping use in both 
developing country samples, in contrast with the lack of explanatory power for this 
variable among developed countries.  
In short, we see evidence that applied tariff changes are a motivating factor 
behind filing an antidumping petition only among heavy users developing countries, thus 
qualifying the impressions that can be derived by the simple correlations shown in Figure 
1.  The results for tariff levels and tariff changes are consistent with a world where 
                                                 
17 Our definition of developed countries includes Japan and Norway, neither of which are not traditional 
users of antidumping.   18  
antidumping petitions in heavy users are launched in order to preserve current levels of 
high protection.  In contrast, developed countries, which have much lower tariff levels 
and larger percentage changes in tariff rates (see Table 7) do not seem to be characterized 
by this same phenomenon;  trade liberalization and tariff levels are not helpful predictors 
of antidumping patterns among high income countries. 
We turn now to a discussion of other possible explanations of antidumping 
petition activity.  These other factors are used as control variables in order to be able to 
be as precise as possible in quantifying the effects of trade liberalization on antidumping.  
However, they also are of interest in their own right since their relevance has been 
discussed in the literature and here we offer an assessment over a large set of countries.  
First of all, we see strong evidence that trading partners’ use of antidumping may 
influence the incidence of antidumping in both developed and developing countries in 
Tables 3 and 4.  Both subsamples show that retaliation variables help explain the 
probability of observing an antidumping petition.  We see that the coefficient on bilateral 
retaliation within the same sector (RETALIATION_INIT) has the expected positive sign 
and is significantly different from zero at a one percent level in all specifications in both 
developed and developing countries.  The same is true for the total number of 
antidumping measures actually imposed in the sector in the partner country 
(RETALIATION_MEAS) as well as the number of antidumping cases brought in all 
sectors in the partner country (RETALIATION_INIT_AGG).
18  These results are 
consistent with the existing literature that shows that retaliation may play an important 
role in the antidumping motivations.  These patterns for retaliation do not hold, however, 
for developing countries that have become heavy users of antidumping as shown in Table 
                                                 
18 The results are qualitatively identical if  RETALIATION_MEAS_AGG is used instead.   19  
5 where none of the coefficient estimates are significant.  
Our earlier discussion also suggested that there should be a difference in the size 
of the marginal probability effects across these three regressors.  In particular, we 
expected that measures actually imposed in a sector should have the largest effect (since 
they result in a greater trade impact) than simple initiations in the sector.  We also 
expected that the country-wide initiations in the partner country should have less of an 
effect than either of sectoral effects since the industry considering filing a petition is less 
likely to care about antidumping activity in other sectors of the partner country.  We do 
see some weak evidence in favor of these predictions.  In fact, the estimate for the 
marginal effects for sectoral measures imposed (RETALIATION_MEAS) is the largest 
of all the retaliation regressors in both developed and developing countries (though only 
marginally so in some cases).  In addition, the marginal probability effects for petitions 
initiated at the national level (RETALIATION_INIT_AGG) is smaller than either of the 
sectoral measures in both the developed and developing country samples, with only one 
exception.  In other words, we see evidence that industries considering filing a petition 
are more likely to be concerned about whether partner country actions have directly 
affected their export possibilities in the same sector than about petitions filed at the 
country or sector level.   
The estimation results also allow us to examine the impact of deflected trade in 
the motivations for filing a petition.  The results are consistent with the existing literature-
---antidumping actions in third countries can increase the probability that an industry may 
file an antidumping petition against a partner.  In particular, all coefficients for our 
measures of deflection at the sectoral level are positive (as expected) and significantly   20  
different from zero at a one percent level.  However, antidumping actions in all sectors 
across the world (DEFLECTION_INIT_AGG) do not have any affect on filing 
behavior.
19  Once again, we interpret this to mean that an industry cares more about what 
is occurring in its own sector than antidumping actions at a global or aggregate level.  
There is one notable difference for the retaliation and deflection variables across 
the developed and developing country samples.  In particular, we see that the point 
estimates for marginal probability effects are much larger for all of these regressors in 
developing countries than their developed country counterparts.  This is consistent with a 
world in which strategic considerations may be more important for new users of 
antidumping than for traditional users. 
We now turn to the variables that control for recent trends in sectoral trade.  Both 
IMPORT_GROWTH and IMPORT_SHARE have positive and significant coefficients at 
least at 5 percent level in all tables.
20  These results are consistent with a world in which 
industries are more likely to file a petition against partner countries with a large and 
growing share in the import market for the sector in question, a result which reflects the 
expected outcome that countries use antidumping in sectors under import pressure.  The 
significance also reflects once again the importance of time-varying sectoral effects in the 
empirical analysis.   
We see some similarities but also some differences across the developed and 
developing country samples when we consider the effects of macroeconomic regressors.  
                                                 
19 The same holds true for DEFLECTION_MEAS_AGG, which controls for the impact of trade diverted by 
antidumping measures in place in all countries. 
20 All the results presented exclude outliers for import growth (i.e., top 10 percent of available 
observations).  This means deleting from the analysis any observation with import growth that exceeds 245 
percent and 275 percent in one year for developed countries and developing countries, respectively.  
IMPORT_GROWTH would present the opposite sign if these observations were not deleted although the 
other results would not change. Note that excluding IMPORT_GROWTH would not qualitatively change 
any result.    21  
Table 3 shows that a strong currency results in an increased probability of observing an 
antidumping petition in the developed world, which is consistent with earlier studies.  
However, no such pattern exists for developing countries, which may reflect a more 
prevalent use of fixed exchange rates among these countries (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2002).  Moreover, we see only weak evidence of a cyclical pattern to antidumping 
petitions in the developed world---the positive coefficient on GROWTH suggests that as 
economy-wide growth increases, there is an increased likelihood of a petition.  However, 
the significance of this coefficient is not robust across specifications.  There is no 
evidence of explanatory power for GROWTH in the developing country samples;  only 
one specification out of nine in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that economic growth is 
important.  This suggests that industries in developing countries are more focused on 
their own economic conditions than overall performance in the nation’s economy when 
deciding to file an antidumping petition.  It might also suggest that administrators in these 
countries are not responding to broad economic pressures with the imposition of 
antidumping duties. We also see that INFLATION has a positive and significantly (at 5 
percent) coefficient in all specifications across all three tables.  In contrast, the role of 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT is very different between developed and developing countries.  
It has a robust and consistently negative effect, as expected, in the developed world and a 
positive and significant coefficient for almost all specifications involving developing 
countries.  In every specification in Tables 3, 4, and 5 (except one), richer nations (as 
proxied by GDP_PC) are more likely to file AD petitions.  
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IV.1  Sectoral industrial data  
The results suggest that the time-varying sectoral effects are important predictors for the 
probability of observing an antidumping filing.  We saw consistent patterns that sectoral 
considerations were more important than aggregates in the retaliation variables.  We also 
saw that sectoral tariff levels and industry-level import variables were helpful in 
explaining filing patterns.  We therefore turn now to a more detailed consideration of 
these effects by utilizing the newly-available data from the World Bank’s Trade and 
Production database.  In particular, we include one-year changes in the value of sectoral 
output and employment.  As noted above, one of the problems of this approach is that it 
lowers the number of observations that can be used in the analysis.  Nonetheless, the 
addition of these variables includes important time-varying information at the industry-
country level.   
Table 6 reports the marginal probability estimates for developed and heavy user 
developing countries using two different measures:  the change in nominal output and the 
change in sectoral total employment.  The other regressors are based on column (1) in 
Tables 3 and 5. 
Surprisingly, the results show only weak explanatory power in these sectoral 
variables.  For developing countries, we see that falling output is correlated with a higher 
probability of an antidumping petition.  However, the coefficient estimate for changing 
employment is not significantly different from zero.  The results for developed countries 
show no evidence that these measures of sectoral variation have any explanatory power.  
There are a number of explanations for these results.  One possibility is that there are 
other factors more important but are not available, such as profitability.  We do see   23  
however that the sectoral effects of imports continue to help explain filing decisions.  
Another possibility is that industries are forward-looking;  their output and employment 
have not yet changed but high levels and growth of imports suggest future pressures and 
therefore a higher probability of filing an antidumping petition.   
We note that the patterns of signs and statistical significance for other control 
variables in Table 6 are quite similar to those of column (1) of Tables 3 and 5, with 
retaliation variables now significant for the heavy antidumping users among developing 
countries.  Thus, the role of trade liberalization is unchanged despite the much smaller 
sample size when using the sectoral production data.  
 
IV.2  Economic significance 
The marginal effects presented so far do not shed much light on the economic 
significance of our results since the regressors are measured in different scales and they 
present different ranges of variation.  Thus, in Table 7 we report percentage changes in 
the average probability of filing an antidumping case resulting from a one standard 
deviation change in each regressor while keeping all other determinants at their mean 
values. The table also reports the mean and standard deviation of each regressor to 
understand the order of magnitude of these changes. For each group of countries, we 
report the results for the specifications in the first two columns of Tables 3 trough 5. 
  We focus first on our measure of trade liberalization, which is the main variable 
of interest.  For those countries where TRADE_LIB is significant, it seems that trade 
liberalization can have a large impact on the probability of antidumping filings.  In 
particular, columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 suggests that a one standard deviation increase   24  
in tariff liberalization in developing countries that frequently use antidumping results in 
about a 32 percent increase in the probability of observing an initiation.  Interestingly, we 
see that these “heavy users” of antidumping have liberalized much less than the entire 
sample of developing countries.  This result reinforces the evidence in Moore and 
Zanardi (forthcoming) that antidumping does not seem to facilitate trade liberalization 
efforts.  
   The three groups of countries are relatively similar in terms of the economic 
significance of retaliation (when significant) and deflection;  the estimated effects of 
these regressors are broadly comparable across columns.  The results are also similar for 
IMPORT_GROWTH and IMPORT_SHARE while the results for the macro controls can 
be quite different but driven by countries’ specific experiences.
21 
  It is interesting to note the similarities in the effects of various regressors and the 
fact that these countries are very much comparable in terms of import performance and 
their passive antidumping experience (i.e., retaliation and deflection).  Thus, the different 
results for the substitution effects from tariffs to antidumping require other explanations.  
The long experience of developed countries with antidumping and the already low level 
of tariffs at the beginning of the sample may explain why trade liberalization is not a 
significant determinant of antidumping in the developed world.  Among developing 
countries, though, it seems that learning is important.  Industries in heavy users countries 
may have understood the relevance of the antidumping mechanism and how it can play at 
their advantage to limit the effect of trade liberalization as well as to limit the possibility 
of trade liberalization overall (as pointed out by Moore and Zanardi, forthcoming).  
                                                 
21 For example, the large effect of exchange rates in the first four columns of Table 7 is clearly driven by 
some huge changes occurring for some of the countries included in these samples.   25  
Although the results found for these countries cannot be generalized to all new users, they 
suggest that the role of antidumping within each country can evolve dramatically.  
 
V.  Conclusions  
This study contributes to a small but growing literature concerning the relationship 
between trade liberalization and the use of antidumping.  We focus on one particular 
aspect of this dynamic, in particular whether recent changes in tariffs at the sectoral level 
play a role in industries filing antidumping petitions.  The null hypothesis is that they do 
(i.e., industries may react to falling statutory protection by turning instead to the WTO-
consistent antidumping measures).  Panel B in Figure 1 showed that there is a simple 
correlation between the two;  tariffs have fallen dramatically in recent decades among 
developing countries and the prevalence of antidumping actions has spread across the 
world to many countries. 
Our results suggest some support for the proposition that industries are more 
likely to file antidumping petitions in sectors with declining applied tariffs but only for a 
specific subsample of developing countries.  In particular, we only find such a positive 
correlation among developing countries that have become heavy users of antidumping in 
recent years.  This statistical result is also economically significant since our estimates 
imply that a one standard deviation increase in tariff cuts would lead to a 32 percent 
increase in the probability of filing an antidumping petition for these countries.  These 
results mirrors recent work by Bown and Tovar (2008) on the reforms undertaken by 
India in the 1990s.  They conclude that the probability of initiating antidumping and 
safeguard proceeding is 50 percent higher as a result of a one standard deviation increase   26  
in trade liberalization. 
The empirical analysis, however, suggests that this substitution effect does not 
hold for other developing and developed countries.  These contrasting results may be due 
to the fact that the other developing countries in our sample initiated much fewer 
antidumping petitions while developed countries already had very low tariff rates over 
the entire period covered in the analysis (i.e., the structural adjustment resulting from 
substantial trade liberalization had taken place in earlier years).  These results are 
therefore different from those reported in Feinberg and Reynolds (2007), who analyze the 
relationship between bound tariffs and antidumping activity.  They find similar results to 
ours for all developing countries in their sample but a statistically significant negative, 
and unexpected, correlation for developed countries.  Our result suggests that this 
unexpected result for developed countries is not robust to changing specifications and 
different data. 
On top of these novel conclusions, we also contribute to the empirical literature 
on the determinants of antidumping filings by analyzing how antidumping petitions are 
influenced by other countries’ use of antidumping (i.e., retaliation and deflection), 
microeconomic conditions (i.e., at the sectoral level), and overall macroeconomic 
environment.  By and large, our results are similar to the existing literature, with the 
exception for the lack of evidence on the effect of growth on initiations.   27  
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Figure 1: Antidumping initiations and average applied tariffs 
 




Panel B: Developing countries 
 
 
Notes: data based on countries included in empirical analysis (see Table 1 for details). 
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Developing countries            
Argentina*  1995-2002  149 1.40%  13.53 14.15 -4.65% 
Bolivia  1996-2002  0 0.00%  9.90 9.60 3.03% 
Brazil*  1992-2002  109 0.90%  46.28 15.49 66.52% 
Chile  1995-2002  13 0.14%  10.96 8.00 27.02% 
China  1997-2002  13 0.63%  40.58 18.07 55.48% 
Colombia  1994-2002  27 0.23%  8.15 13.52 -65.78% 
Costa Rica  2002  0 0.00%  7.96 6.61 16.97% 
Ecuador  1996-2000  2 0.01%  10.96 15.09 -37.71% 
Guatemala  1998-2002  0 0.00%  11.09 8.68 21.68% 
Honduras  2002  0 0.00%  8.73 7.99 8.45% 
Hungary  1994  0 0.00%  13.73 12.55 8.62% 
India*  1993, 2000-02  160 2.62%  87.89 36.58 58.38% 
Indonesia  1996-97, 2002  15 0.58%  21.50 11.41 46.93% 
Jamaica  2002  0 0.00%  16.59 8.68 47.65% 
Lithuania  1998  0 0.00%  4.34 4.36 -0.50% 
Malaysia  1994  0 0.00%  17.33 15.07 13.03% 
Mexico*  1998-2002  55 0.65%  14.42 20.37 -41.22% 
Nicaragua  2001-2002  0 0.00%  6.58 5.72 13.08% 
Paraguay  1997-2002  1 0.03%  9.88 13.76 -39.26% 
Peru*  1996-2001  67 0.55%  18.70 13.48 27.92% 
Philippines  1994-96, 2001-02  13 0.33%  21.74 8.18 62.37% 
Poland  1998-2002  10 0.19%  10.48 19.24 -83.67% 
South Africa*  1999-2002  47 0.79%  12.85 9.60 25.34% 
Taiwan  2002  0 0.00%  9.04 7.98 11.67% 
Thailand  1994-1996  3 0.10%  43.62 26.18 39.98% 
Trinidad and Tobago  2002  0 0.00%  16.79 9.26 44.88% 
Turkey  1996-2000  20 0.33%  10.22 9.98 2.31% 
Uruguay  1998-2002  7 0.15%  12.49 15.06 -20.59% 
Venezuela  1998-2002  7 0.13%  14.63 13.74 6.08% 
Subsample total    718  0.50%  18.31 13.05 10.83% 
Developed countries    
Australia  1994, 1999, 2000-02  96 1.21%  12.46 4.23 66.00% 
Canada  1996-2002  83 0.68%  10.13 4.64 54.19% 
EU  1991-2001  327 1.04%  8.76 5.49 37.30% 
Japan  1991, 1996-02  5 0.04%  6.75 3.99 40.91% 
New Zealand  1999-2002  15 0.33%  6.80 3.61 46.92% 
Norway  1996-2002  0 0.00%  5.50 2.65 51.80% 
United States  1992-2002  428 1.40%  5.51 3.37 38.88% 
Subsample total    951 0.85%  7.99 5.71 48.00% 
Notes: Summary statistics based on 115,138 observations for developing countries and 85,526 observations for developed 
countries. A * identifies heavy user developing countries. Initial (final) tariff rate refers to the country’s average tariff rate 
in the first (last) year used in the calculation of TRADE_LIB2.   31  
Table 2: List of variables 
Variable  Expected 
sign  Description 
TRADE_LIB2 (change 2 years)  +  The percentage change in sector k applied tariffs over two years 
TRADE_LIB3 (change 3 years)  +  The percentage change in sector k applied tariffs over three years 
TARIFF LEVEL  ?  Unweighted average applied tariff rates for sector k 
RETALIATION_INIT +  Number of AD initiations launched in sector k against country i by 
country j 
RETALIATION_MEAS   +  Number of antidumping measures imposed against country i by 
country j in sector k 
RETALIATION_INIT_AGG  +  Number of AD initiations in any sector in country j 
RETALIATION_MEAS_AGG  +  Number of AD measures in any sector in country j 
DEFLECTION_INIT +  Number of AD initiations world-wide (exclusive of the importing 
country) in all sectors 
DEFLECTION_MEAS +  Number of AD measures imposed world-wide (exclusive of the 
importing country) for sector k 
DEFLECTION_INIT_AGG   +  Number of AD initiations in any sector in the all countries  
DEFLECTION_MEAS_AGG  +  Number of AD measures in any sector in the all countries 
IMPORT_GROWTH +  Percentage change in sectoral imports from t-1 to t for sector k in 
country i  
IMPORT_SHARE  +  Share of exports from country j to country i for sector k 
OUTPUT CHANGE  -  Annual change in nominal output in sector k country i  
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE  -  Annual change in total employment change in sector k country i  
EXCHANGE_RATE   -  Annual average bilateral exchange rate between country i and 
country j (lower number means higher domestic value) 
GROWTH  -  Annual average real GDP growth rate in country i  
INFLATION  +  Average annual inflation rate in country i  
CURRENT_ACCOUNT  -  Current account balance as a percentage of GDP in country i  
GDP_PC  +  GDP per capita in country i  
Notes: Country i refers to importing country, country j to exporting country, and k to 3-digit ISIC manufacturing sector.   32  




sign  (1) (2) (3 (4) (5) 
TRADE_LIB2 (change 2 years)  +  -0.00004    -0.00003  -0.00004  0.00006 
    [0.00005]  [0.00004]  [0.00005]  [0.00009] 
TRADE_LIB3 (change 3 years)  +    0.000001       
      [0.000016]     
TARIFF  LEVEL  ? 0.0014 0.0004 0.0012 0.0013 0.0023 
    [0.0013] [0.0005] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0021] 
RETALIATION_INIT +  0.0002***  0.0001***      0.0003*** 
   [0.0002]  [0.0001]      [0.0002] 
RETALIATION_MEAS  +     0.0004***    
       [0.0003]    
RETALIATION_INIT_AGG +        0.0001***   
         [0.0001]  
DEFLECTION_INIT +  0.0001***  0.00004***      0.0002*** 
   [0.0001]  [0.00004]      [0.0002] 
DEFLECTION_MEAS  +     0.0002***    
       [0.0001]    
DEFLECTION_INIT_AGG  +       0.000001  
         [0.000001]  
IMPORT_GROWTH  +  0.0001***  0.00003***  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
    [0.0001]  [0.00003]  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
IMPORT_SHARE  +  0.0024*** 0.0031*** 0.0024*** 0.0027*** 0.0037*** 
    [0.0018] [0.0035] [0.0018] [0.0020] [0.0023] 
EXCHANGE_RATE  -  -0.00005*** -0.00002*** -0.00005*** -0.00005*** -0.00006*** 
   [0.00002]  [0.00002]  [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
GROWTH  - 0.0038 0.0007 0.0035 0.0037  0.0071** 
    [0.0039] [0.0010] [0.0037] [0.0038] [0.0062] 
INFLATION  +  0.0062*** 0.0015*** 0.0055*** 0.0066*** 0.0296*** 
    [0.0050] [0.0018] [0.0045] [0.0051] [0.0194] 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT -  -0.0070***  -0.0020*** -0.0063*** -0.0068***  -0.0032 
    [0.0053] [0.0023] [0.0050] [0.0053] [0.0027] 
GDP_PC  +  1.11 x 10-6*** 2.03 x 10-7*** 9.24 x 10-7***  8.30 x 10-7**  3.44 x 10-6***
    [8.45 x 10-7]  [2.39 x 10-7]  [7.37 x 10-7]  [6.73 x 10-07]  [2.17 x 10-6] 
Year and Industry fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo  R-squared    0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.28 
Pseudo  likelihood    3,049.77 2,793.53 3,072.27 3,151.73 2,988.77 
Observed  probability   0.0085 0.0087 0.0085 0.0085 0.0093 
Predicted  probability   0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
Observations   85,526  77,364 85,526 85,526 78,743 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; in column (5), only countries that 
initiated at least one antidumping initiations are included.  The coefficients are the marginal probability effects, i.e. 0.0002 
means that the probability of observing an antidumping petition increases by 0.02 percent.    33  




sign  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TRADE_LIB2 (change 2 years)  +  -0.0004    -0.0004  -0.0004  0.0002 
    [0.0003]  [0.0003]  [0.0003]  [0.0004] 
TRADE_LIB3 (change 3 years)  +    -0.0001       
     [0.0002]      
TARIFF  LEVEL  ?  0.0081*** 0.0076*** 0.0083*** 0.0082*** 0.0073*** 
    [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0017] 
RETALIATION_INIT +  0.0010***  0.0012***      0.0012*** 
    [0.0003]  [0.0004]    [0.0004] 
RETALIATION_MEAS  +     0.0014***    
       [0.0005]    
RETALIATION_INIT_AGG  +      0.0003***   
        [0.0001]   
DEFLECTION_INIT +  0.0005***  0.0007***      0.0006*** 
    [0.0001]  [0.0001]    [0.0001] 
DEFLECTION_MEAS  +     0.0007***    
       [0.0001]    
DEFLECTION_INIT_AGG  +      4.65  x  10-7   
        [3.91  x  10-6]   
IMPORT_GROWTH  +  0.0003***  0.0003**  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
IMPORT_SHARE  +  0.0098*** 0.0127*** 0.0104*** 0.0343*** 0.0125*** 
    [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0103] [0.0023] 
EXCHANGE_RATE  -  -1.80 x 10-7  -2.06 x 10-7  -1.81 x 10-7  -1.90 x 10-7  -2.30 x 10-7 
    [8.72 x 10-8]  [1.10 x 10-7]  [9.21 x 10-8]  [9.14 x 10-8]  [1.08 x 10-7] 
GROWTH  - 0.0017 0.0062 0.0013 0.0002 0.0066 
    [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0035] [0.0033] [0.0047] 
INFLATION  +  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
   [0.00003]  [0.00005]  [0.00003]] [0.00003] [0.00004] 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT  -  0.0107*** 0.0150*** 0.0011*** 0.0103***  0.0039 
    [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0031] 
GDP_PC  +  0.00002*** 0.00001*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
    [4.40 x 10-6]  [3.07 x 10-6]  [4.51 x 10-6]  [4.45 x 10-6]  [6.63 x 10-6] 
Year and Industry fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.19 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.19 
Pseudo  likelihood    2,963.52 2,770.27 2,983.42 3,064.49 2,893.96 
Observed  probability   0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
Predicted  probability   0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Observations    115,138 101,019 115,138 115,138  98,899 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; in column (5), only countries that 
initiated at least one antidumping initiations are included. The coefficients are the marginal probability effects, i.e. 0.0002 
means that the probability of observing an antidumping petition increases by 0.02 percent.   34  




sign  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TRADE_LIB2 (change 2 years)  +  0.0064***    0.0064***  0.0068*** 
    [0.0019]  [0.0020]  [0.0020] 
TRADE_LIB3 (change 3 years)  +    0.0057***     
     [0.0021]    
TARIFF  LEVEL  ?  0.0277*** 0.0565*** 0.0280*** 0.0286*** 
    [0.0048] [0.0067] [0.0048] [0.0048] 
RETALIATION_INIT +  0.0025  0.0025    
   [0.0014]  [0.0018]     
RETALIATION_MEAS  +    0.0031  
       [0.0020]   
RETALIATION_INIT_AGG  +      0.0007 
        [0.0004] 
DEFLECTION_INIT +  0.0021***  0.0025***     
   [0.0002]  [0.0003]     
DEFLECTION_MEAS  +     0.0025***  
       [0.0003]   
DEFLECTION_INIT_AGG  +      0.00002 
        [0.00002] 
IMPORT_GROWTH +  0.0008**  0.0010**  0.0009***  0.0010*** 
    [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
IMPORT_SHARE  +  0.0324*** 0.0381*** 0.0347*** 0.0371*** 
    [0.0033] [0.0036] [0.0032] [0.0035] 
EXCHANGE_RATE  -  -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003 
    [0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00002] [0.00003] 
GROWTH  -  -0.0162 -0.0641*** -0.0196  -0.0218 
    [0.0171] [0.0229] [0.0174] [0.0175] 
INFLATION +  0.0003**  0.0005***  0.0003**  0.0003** 
    [0.0001]  [0.0002] [0.00001] [0.0001] 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT  -  0.0106*** 0.1304*** 0.0955*** 0.0912*** 
    [0.0023] [0.0274] [0.0205] [0.0204] 
GDP_PC  + 0.00002** 0.00002 0.00004**  0.00004** 
    [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
Year and Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 
Pseudo  likelihood    1,943.05 1,699.67 1,974.11 2,030.70 
Observed  probability   0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 
Predicted  probability   0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
Observations   39,358 31,448 39,358 39,358 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The coefficients are 
the marginal probability effects, i.e. 0.0002 means that the probability of observing an antidumping petition 
increases by 0.02 percent.   35  
Table 6: Results with sectoral industrial data (marginal probability effects) 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OUTPUT_CHANGE -  -0.00003   -0.0089**  
    [0.0002]   [0.004]  
EMPLOYMENT_CHANGE -    -0.0003    0.0053 
     [0.0003]  [0.0049] 
TRADE_LIB2 (change 2 years)  +  0.00004  0.00003  0.0132***  0.0134*** 
    [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0049] [0.0032] 
TARIFF  LEVEL  ?  0.0009  0.0023*** 0.0756*** 0.0682*** 
    [0.0010] [0.0021] [0.0134] [0.0083] 
RETALIATION_INIT +  0.0001 0.0001  0.0093**  0.0066** 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0040] [0.0031] 
DEFLECTION_INIT  +  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0026*** 0.0023*** 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
IMPORT_GROWTH  +  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0015***  0.0011** 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0006] [0.0005] 
IMPORT_SHARE  +  0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0372*** 0.0360*** 
    [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0052] [0.0048] 
EXCHANGE_RATE -  -0.00002**  -0.00003***  -0.00004  -0.00003 
    [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00003] [0.00003] 
GROWTH -  -0.0043**  0.0023  -0.1410  -0.2029*** 
    [0.0039] [0.0031] [0.0094] [0.0627] 
INFLATION +  0.0056***  0.0048***  -0.0009**  -0.0001*** 
   [0.0054]  [0.0046]  [0.00003]  [0.00001] 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT  - -0.0082*** -0.0053*** -0.0151***  -0.0569 
    [0.0077] [0.0049] [0.0869] [0.0069] 
GDP_PC  +  2.32 x 10-7***  1.26 x 10-6***  0.00007  0.00005 
    [3.17 x 10-7]  [1.10 x 10-67]  [0.00005]  [0.00003] 
Year and Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.32 0.30 0.23 0.22 
Pseudo likelihood    1,929.42  2,052.17  930.24  1,094.08 
Observed  probability    0.0084 0.0082 0.0155 0.0138 
Predicted  probability    0.0002 0.0002 0.0056 0.0052 
Observations    58,701 61,760 15,128 19,293 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The coefficients are the marginal 
probability effects, i.e. 0.0002 means that the probability of observing an antidumping petition increases by 0.02 percent. 
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Table 7: Economic significance (percentage change in probability) 




signs  Mean 
(st. dev.)  (1) (2)  Mean 
(st. dev.)  (3) (4)  Mean 
(st. dev.)  (5) (6) 
TRADE_LIB2 (change 2 years)  +  0.13  -3.93  -3.43  0.04  -6.45  -6.17  0.01  32.72*** 31.35*** 
    (0.27) [3.55] [3.65]  (0.26) [4.85] [4.72]  (0.22)  [11.37]  [11.01] 
TARIFF  LEVEL  ?  0.05  20.59  18.21  0.15 87.40***  86.41***  0.17 71.01***  69.00*** 
    (0.04) [12.95]  [12.96]  (0.11) [18.31]  [18.01]  (0.20) [16.06]  [15.60] 
RETALIATION_INIT  +  0.004 7.94***    0.004 6.75***    0.005  5.00   
    (0.09) [2.66]    (0.09) [1.88]    (0.10) [2.78]   
RETALIATION_MEAS  +  0.002   9.07***  0.002   5.77***  0.003    3.92 
    (0.06)  [2.72]  (0.06)  [1.68]  (0.06)  [2.56] 
DEFLECTION_INIT  + 0.13  42.20***   0.23  39.07***   0.21  44.66***  
    (0.68) [4.75]    (0.94) [2.92]    (0.88) [4.04]   
DEFLECTION_MEAS  + 0.07   34.92***  0.13   31.53***  0.12   32.55*** 
    (0.46)  [4.75]  (0.60)  [2.80]  (0.58)  [3.91] 
IMPORT_GROWTH  +  0.05 32.97***  35.46***  0.13 16.36***  16.76***  0.13  12.63**  14.18*** 
    (0.56) [5.59] [5.72]  (0.72) [5.16] [5.09]  (0.72) [5.54] [5.47] 
IMPORT_SHARE +  0.01  48.52***  51.66***  0.02  57.27*** 59.25***  0.02  50.06*** 52.17*** 
    (0.05)  [5.42] [5.62] (0.06) [18.30] [3.96] (0.06)  [3.93] [3.95] 
EXCHANGE_RATE -  13.54  -100.00***  -100.00***  2,074.51  -97.26***  -96.94***  4.74  -19.78  -23.11 
   (428.37)  [.]
  [.] (24,376.85)  [6.76]  [7.67] (61.34)  [21.83] [22.36] 
GROWTH -  0.03  18.22  17.96  0.04  3.58  2.62  0.03  -7.39  -8.64 
    (0.01)  [10.16]  [10.12]  (0.03) [6.83] [6.74]  (0.02) [7.59] [7.38] 
INFLATION  +  0.02 43.72***  41.11***  0.69 20.01***  20.26***  1.63 -23.49***  -22.42*** 
    (0.02)  [14.61]  [13.94]  (2.65) [6.30] [6.37]  (4.30) [8.23] [8.37] 
CURRENT_ACCOUNT -  -0.002  -51.85***  -50.49***  -0.02 30.54***  30.17***  -0.03 44.32***  42.87*** 
    (0.03) [4.86] [4.93]  (0.03) [6.57] [6.51]  (0.02)  [11.36]  [11.12] 
GDP_PC  +  270.80  30.39*** 26.94***  34.74  33.58*** 33.11***  43.45  22.77**  22.11** 
    (68.28)  [10.39]  [10.07]  (23.11) [6.93] [6.79]  (24.57) [9.91] [9.72] 
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in the predicted probability of initiating an AD petition when each regressor is increased by one standard deviation and all 
other regressors are kept at their mean; robust standard errors in square brackets calculated using the delta method; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 